



A Better Way: Rethinking SB 123 Probationary 
Drug Treatment in Kansas* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is no denying that drug abuse and addiction have plagued our 
nation’s criminal justice system.
1
  Drugs have not only destroyed the 
lives of millions of Americans, but have also propagated a host of 
offenses across the criminal spectrum.
2
  Today, an enormous share of 
inmates across the country report histories of drug use.
3
  Kansas inmates 
are no exception.
4
  The Kansas Sentencing Commission reported that 
Kansans committed more drug crimes
5
 in 2012 than any other offense.
6
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 1.  NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, BEHIND BARS II: SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
AND AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.casacolumbia.org/download/file/fid/487 (providing the startling fact that in 2005 
“federal, state, and local governments spent $74 billion in court, probation, parole and incarceration 
costs of adult and juvenile substance-involved offenders”). 
 2.  See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, DRUG USE AND DEPENDENCE, 
STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 2004, at 5–6 (2006), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dudsfp04.pdf (explaining that one-fourth of violent offenders in 
prison committed the offense while under the influence of drugs, and one-third of property offenders 
in state prison were motivated by the need for drug money); see also EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, HOW ILLICIT DRUG USE AFFECTS BUSINESS 
AND THE ECONOMY (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/effects_of_drugs_on_economy_jw
_5-24-11_0.pdf (drug abuse cost our nation’s criminal justice system $61 billon dollars in 2007 (last 
available estimate)).   
 3.  See MUMOLA & KARBERG, supra note 2, at 1–2 (approximately 69% of state prisoners, and 
approximately 64% of federal prisoners, reported regular drug use; 32% of state prisoners, and 26% 
of federal prisoners reported using drugs at the time of the offense). 
 4.  Kansas Department of Corrections secretary, Ray Roberts, noted this past summer that the 
Kansas prison system is at full capacity, and “[s]ubstance abuse and mental illness—those are the 
two big drivers.” Hurst Laviana, Corrections Secretary: Kansas Prisons are Running at Capacity, 
WICHITA EAGLE (July 19, 2013), http://www.kansas.com/2013/07/19/2896260/corrections-
secretary-prisons.html. 
 5.  “Drug crime” refers to those crimes involving controlled substances, for example, 
“unlawful possession of a controlled substance,” “unlawful manufacturing of a controlled 
 
  
1366 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
Of the over 13,000 offenders sentenced across the state in 2012, roughly 
30% of those offenders were sentenced for drug offenses.
7
  Indeed, the 
gravity of this problem is so understood that further acknowledgement 
seems to only harden our collective sentiment that the problem is 
incurable. 
Thus, courts across the country have struggled to determine how best 
to deal with this problematic and ever-increasing population of offenders.  
While incarceration has been the traditional curative nationwide, prison 





  In fact, offenders struggling with drug 
addiction have such an extreme rate of recidivism that the problem has 
been likened to a “revolving door.”
10
  Many jurisdictions have come to 
realize that simply locking up drug-involved offenders is ineffective.
11
  
                                                          
substance,” “unlawful cultivation or distribution of a controlled substance,” etc.  See KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 21-5701 to -5717 (West 2013). 
 6.  KAN. SENTENCING COMM’N, FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2013), available at 
http://www.sentencing.ks.gov/document-center/reports.  
 7.  Id. 
 8.  For the purposes of this Comment, the term “drug offender” refers to the offender 
convicted of a drug crime, for example illegal possession, manufacturing, distribution, etc.  The term 
“drug-involved offender” (or “substance-involved offender”) is broader and refers to any criminal 
offender who abuses drugs. 
 9.  See JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT 
IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 30–31 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that former Drug 
Czar in the Clinton Administration, Barry McCaffrey, has even acknowledge that “we have a failed 
social policy and it has to be re-evaluated.  Otherwise, we’re going to bankrupt ourselves.  Because 
we can’t incarcerate our way out of this problem.”). 
 10.  State v. Preston, 195 P.3d 240, 244 (Kan. 2008) (referring to a February 12, 2003 
memorandum from Kansas Sentencing Commission to the Senate Judiciary Committee); see also 
NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 1, at 5 (“Substance-involved offenders 
are likelier to recidivate than those who are not substance involved.  Over half (52.2 percent) of 
substance-involved inmates have one or more previous incarcerations compared with 31.2 percent of 
inmates who are not substance involved.”). 
 11.  It is now widely acknowledged that a war-on-drugs mentality, steeped in deterrence, is an 
ineffective approach to the problem.  Over the last forty years, despite the continued imposition of 
stiff penalties, the use of illegal drugs has continued across the country.  See generally GRAY, supra 
note 9, at 17–158 (describing the history of drug laws in the United States and how modern drug 
laws have harmed communities and drug users themselves).   
This is the reality we are facing.  Under our current policy, drugs are everywhere . . . .  
Our current system is completely unable to keep illicit drugs out of our communities and 
away from our children.  Even Joseph A. Califano, the former Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the chairman of the Columbia 
University Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse said, ‘American children are telling 
us they are drenched in drugs.’   
Id. at 50–51.  See also NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 1, at 5 
(“Breaking the cycle of re-arrest and re-incarceration requires breaking the cycle of 
addiction.”). 
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The reason for this is simple.  Drug addiction, by its very nature, cannot 
be cured through incarceration.
12
 
To address this revolving-door problem, many states have turned to 
drug courts.  By combining probation, drug treatment, and continuous 
judicial supervision, drug courts have proven themselves an enormous 
success.
13
  Indeed, “[m]ore research has been published on drug 
courts . . . than virtually all other correctional programs combined.”
14
  
Not only have drug courts saved countless dollars, but, more importantly, 
they have proven themselves extremely effective in breaking the cycle of 
addiction and recidivism.
15
  In response to such favorable results, many 
states have established drug courts as a long-term solution to crime 
emanating from drug abuse and addiction.
16
 
In 2010, the Kansas Supreme Court contacted the National Center 
for State Courts (NCSC) to “research the feasibility and practicality of 
instituting state-wide level management over drug courts within the 
state.”
17
  The question was whether Kansas should “support and 
institutionalize, at the state level, the development of traditional drug 
courts.”
18
  The report provided by the NCSC describes 
                                                          
 12.  See Hon. Peggy F. Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Court in the Twenty-First 
Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 717, 721 
(2008) (“Incarceration does little to change substance use patterns.  Subsequent to release, ex-
offenders continue to use alcohol or other drugs at alarming rates.”). 
 13.  NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., THE DRUG COURT JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK 1 (Douglas B. 
Marlowe & William J. Meyer eds., 2011) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK] (“Five independent 
meta-analyses—advanced statistical procedures conducted by rigorous scientific teams—have 
concluded that drug courts reduce crime and substance abuse.  The most conservative estimates 
indicate that drug courts save money for taxpayers on the order of two to four times the initial 
investment.  In short, drug courts work!”); see also Hon. Jerome Eckrich & Roland Loudenburg, 
Answering the Call: Drug Courts in South Dakota, 57 S.D. L. REV. 171, 179 (2012) (noting that 
“[a]lthough there are criticisms with regard to the research published about the effectiveness of drug 
courts, the value of drug courts and their positive effect on recidivism cannot be denied,” and “[t]he 
research now available . . . has reliably demonstrated that drug courts outperform virtually all other 
strategies that have been used with drug-involved criminal offenders”). 
 14.  JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK, supra note 13, at 1.  
 15.  Id.; see also DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L ASSOC. OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, RESEARCH 
UPDATE ON ADULT DRUG COURTS 1–3 (2010), available at 
http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/Research%20Update%20on%20Adult%20Drug%20
Courts%20-%20NADCP_1.pdf (providing various studies on the effectiveness of drug courts, not 
only by reducing recidivism, but also by “elicit[ing] substantial improvements in other outcomes 
apart from criminal recidivism”).  
 16.  See infra notes 78–99 and accompanying text. 
 17.  NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, KANSAS DRUG COURT FEASIBILITY STUDY 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.sji.gov/PDF/KS_Drug_Court_Feasibility_Study.pdf [hereinafter 
FEASIBILITY STUDY]. 
 18.  Id.  
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“institutionalization” as “the process by which individual drug courts 
evolve from separate experimental entities to a statewide network that is 
stable, far-reaching, reliably funded and closely monitored.”
19
  Though a 
handful of Kansas counties are currently operating drug courts,
20
 Kansas 
has yet to institutionalize drug courts at the state level.
21
  The Kansas 
Legislature, however, has not ignored this revolving-door problem posed 
by drug-involved offenders.  As the NCSC study notes, in 2003 the state 
legislature passed Senate Bill 123 (SB 123).
22
  This law institutionalized 




SB 123 is the central focus of this Comment.  Specifically, this 
Comment examines certain provisions of SB 123 and how these 
provisions relate to drug court practice.  When scrutinized, SB 123 has 
several deficiencies.  First, the eligibility and admission requirements of 
SB 123, which limit the program to a specific class of offenders, 
undermine the law’s effectiveness and hinder its goals.  Second, SB 123 
lacks the cornerstone of essential drug court practice: continuous judicial 
supervision.  Third, the compulsory nature of SB 123, the law’s ability to 
impose broad and far-reaching sanctions, and its denial of jail-time credit 
in light of its own strict termination requirements, are not only 
counterproductive, but also raise constitutional concerns regarding due 
process.  Because of these concerns and deficiencies, SB 123 should be 
replaced through the state-wide institutionalization of drug courts; and, 
even if not replaced, SB 123 should not serve as a model if drug courts 
are institutionalized in Kansas.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. An Overview: SB 123 Drug Treatment 
In 2003, the Kansas Legislature enacted SB 123, thus creating an 
alternative sentencing policy for first-time, non-violent drug offenders.
24
  
                                                          
 19.  Id. at 2.  
 20.  See U.S. Drug Court Map: Find a Drug Court in Your Community, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG 
COURT PROF’LS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/find-drug-court (last visited Apr. 2014) (interactive 
map showing that there are currently eight adult drug courts in Kansas, specifically in Allen, 
Cowley, Geary, Lynon, Sedgwick, Shawnee, and Wyandotte counties). 
 21.  FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 17, at 1.   
 22.  Id. at 4. 
 23.  Id. at 5.  Today, SB 123 is codified in section 21-6824 of Kansas Statutes Annotated. 
 24.  2003 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 135 (S.B. 123). 
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The Kansas Supreme Court reiterated the goal of SB 123: 
[T]he Kansas Sentencing Commission identified the goal of the 
alternative drug policy (S.B. 123) as: ‘to provide community 
punishment and the opportunity for treatment to nonviolent offenders 
with drug abuse problems in order to more effectively address the 
revolving door of drug addicts through the state prisons, which should 
be reserved for serious, violent offenders.’
25
 
The law provides probationary supervision and mandatory drug 
treatment for a select class of drug-involved offenders.
26
  Over the past 
ten years, SB 123 has remained essentially the same, and today is 
codified in section 21-6824 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated.
27
  The 
eligibility and admission requirements of SB 123 are discussed below, as 
well as the law’s provisions regarding treatment and termination. 
1. Eligibility 
SB 123 drug treatment is limited to a certain class of offenders.  
First, it is limited to only adult offenders convicted of unlawfully 
possessing a controlled substance under section 21-6706.
28
  Offenders 
convicted of unlawfully manufacturing controlled substances (K.S.A. § 
21-5703), unlawfully cultivating or distributing a controlled substance 
(K.S.A. § 21-5705), or unlawfully deriving proceeds from the sale, 
manufacture, or distribution of drugs (K.S.A. § 21-5716) are not eligible 
for SB 123 drug treatment.
29
 
Second, SB 123 is limited to only first-time and second-time felony 
possession offenders. According to the Kansas sentencing grid for drug 
crimes, “The sentence for a third or subsequent felony conviction of . . . 
[unlawful possession of a controlled substance] . . . shall be a 
presumptive term of imprisonment and the defendant shall be sentenced 
                                                          
 25.  State v. Preston, 195 P.3d 240, 244 (Kan. 2008) (quoting a 2003 memorandum from 
Kansas Sentencing Commission to the Senate Judiciary Committee). 
 26.  KAN. SENTENCING COMM’N & KAN. DEPT. CORR., 2003 - SENATE BILL 123 
“ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING POLICY FOR NON-VIOLENT DRUG POSSESSION OFFENDERS” 
OPERATIONS MANUAL ch. 4-1, 4-2 (2008), available at http://sentencing.ks.gov/docs/default-
source/sb-123/sb-123—-operations-manual.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [hereinafter SB 123 OPERATIONS 
MANUAL] (an updated version of the SB 123 Operations Manual is currently undergoing 
construction according to the Kansas Sentencing Commission’s website).  
 27.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6824 (West 2013) (formerly K.S.A. § 21-4729). 
 28.  Id. § 21-6824(a).  
 29.  Id. § 21-6824(a)(1)–(2). 
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to prison as provided by this section.”
30
  This term of imprisonment will 
not be subject to modification if the offender: (1) previously completed 
drug treatment or intensive substance abuse treatment; (2) was 
previously discharged from drug treatment or intensive substance abuse 
treatment; or (3) previously refused to participate in drug treatment or 
intensive substance abuse treatment.
31
  In short, the offender gets one 
shot at treatment. 
2. Admission Process 
Offenders who meet the eligibility criteria above will be subject to a 
drug abuse assessment which “shall include a clinical interview with a 
mental health professional and a recommendation concerning drug abuse 
treatment for the offender.”
32
  These offenders will also be subject to a 
criminal risk–need assessment, which “shall be conducted by a court 
services officer or a community corrections officer.”
33
  If the offender is 
assigned a high-risk status according to the drug abuse assessment, and a 
moderate-risk or high-risk status according to the criminal risk–need 
assessment, then the sentencing court shall commit the offender to an SB 
123 drug abuse treatment program.
34
  In other words, for eligible 
offenders who meet the assessment qualifications, SB 123 drug treatment 
is mandatory.  Whether the offender actually desires treatment, or instead 
wishes to serve the underlying sentence, is irrelevant.  The sentencing 
court is required to sentence the offender to SB 123 drug treatment. 
3. Treatment and Supervision 
The drug treatment providers must be licensed by the state to provide 
such treatment, as well as certified by the secretary of corrections to 
participate in the SB 123 program.
35
  While in drug treatment, the 
offenders will be supervised by the Kansas Community Correctional 
Services.
36
  In addition to traditional duties, when working with an 
                                                          
 30.  Id. § 21-6805(f)(1) (emphasis added). 
 31.  Id. § 21-6805(f)(1)–(2) (intensive substance abuse treatment is conducted during an 
offender’s term of imprisonment at a designated facility). 
 32.  Id. § 21-6824(b)(1).  
 33.  Id. § 75-52,144(b). 
 34.  Id. § 21-6824(c).  
 35.  SB 123 OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 26, at ch. 4-5, 4-6, 5-11 (community correction 
agencies will also provide authorization for the drug treatment services provided to the offender).  
 36.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6824(d)(1) (West 2013).  
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offender sentenced under SB 123, the community correctional officer 
also “work[s] with the substance abuse treatment staff to ensure effective 
supervision and monitoring of the offender.”
37
  The probation officer and 
treatment providers are required to regularly conduct team meetings to 




Treatment lasts for a period not to exceed eighteen months.
39
  During 
treatment, SB 123 attempts to address the continuous needs of each 
particular offender in two ways.  First, courts have the ability to modify 
the level of treatment in order to meet an offender’s needs as they 
evolve.
40
  As the Kansas Supreme Court noted in State v. Preston, the 
legislature intended the SB 123 program to “match the level of [drug] 
treatment to the offender’s particular substance abuse needs.”
41
  Such 
modification, furthermore, is not limited to an initial needs assessment.  
“[T]o effect the goals of the legislation,” as the court noted in Preston, 
“the S.B. 123 substance abuse treatment program must be amenable to 
modification or revision to meet the offender’s current needs, as those 
needs change or become more clearly defined.”
42
  The court noted that 
the particular defendant at issue, after being sentenced to SB 123 drug 
treatment, had subsequently demonstrated that she was “unable to handle 
her addiction problem while on her own.”
43
 Accordingly, the district 
court was justified in modifying her SB 123 treatment program by 
ordering her to attend inpatient treatment.
44
 
Second, courts have the ability to address current offender needs via 
sanctions if the offender subsequently violates a condition of his or her 
treatment program.
45
  “Such non-prison sanctions shall include, but not 
be limited to, up to 60 days in a county jail, fines, community service, 
intensified treatment, house arrest and electronic monitoring.”
46
  For 
example, an offender may be required to perform community service for 
failing to participate in treatment, spend a short amount of “shock time” 
in jail for failing to undergo a drug test, or be required to undergo 
                                                          
 37.  Id. § 75-52,144(e).  
 38.  SB 123 OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 26, at ch. 4-3.  
 39.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6824(c) (West 2013).  
 40.  State v. Preston, 195 P.3d 240, 244 (Kan. 2008). 
 41.  Id.; see also State v. Casey, 211 P.3d 847, 856 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).   
 42.  Preston, 195 P.3d at 244.  
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id.  
 45.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3716(g) (West 2013).  
 46.  Id.  
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inpatient drug treatment for failing a drug test.  Essentially, these 
sanctions act as the proverbial “stick” to coerce the offender into 




Offenders in SB 123 drug treatment programs shall be terminated 
from treatment if they (1) are “convicted of a new felony,” or (2) 
establish a “pattern of intentional conduct that demonstrates [their] 
refusal to comply with or participate in the treatment program as 
established by judicial finding.”
48
  To be clear, as the language of K.S.A. 
section 21-6824 explicitly states, termination is mandatory in either of 
these two circumstances.  Moreover, judges may abuse their discretion if 
they do not terminate an offender from SB 123 treatment following one 
of these occurrences.
49
  The Kansas Supreme Court has held that once a 
court has found that an offender has committed a new felony or engaged 
in a pattern of intentional conduct demonstrating refusal to comply, the 




The courts, however, are not limited to only the above two 
circumstances as a basis for revoking treatment.  The Kansas Supreme 
Court held in State v. Gumfory: 
[N]othing in the language of [K.S.A. § 21-6824(f)(1)(A)–(B)] suggests 
that these are the only occasions when an offender may be 
discharged. . . .  As such, we conclude that [K.S.A. § 21-6824(f)(1)(A)–
(B) does] not set forth the exclusive grounds for revocation of S.B. 123 
probation; rather, they set forth the grounds for when the district court 
must revoke the offender’s S.B. 123 probation.
51
 
The Gumfory court recognized that district courts have broad 
                                                          
 47.  See SB 123 OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 26, at ch. 4-2 (discussing the ability to 
sanction SB 123 probationers under the heading “Offender Accountability”).  
 48.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6824(f)(1) (West 2013).  
 49.  See State v. Green, 153 P.3d 1216, 1225 (Kan. 2007) (“An abuse of discretion may be 
found if a district judge’s decision goes outside the framework of or fails to properly consider 
statutory limitations or legal standards.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
 50.  State v. Bee, 207 P.3d 244, 249 (Kan. 2009) (noting that the “statutory language ‘shall’ 
generally represents a mandatory course of conduct,” and that because a judicial finding established 
that the defendant had not complied with treatment, the district court was required to revoke the 
treatment program (citations omitted)); see also State v. Craven, No. 102,557, 2010 WL 1078472, at 
*1–2 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2010). 
 51.  State v. Gumfory, 135 P.3d 1191, 1196 (Kan. 2006). 
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discretion to impose conditions on general probation.
52
  The court 
reasoned that it was unlikely that the legislature would grant a court such 
broad discretion to impose conditions, only to then limit its ability to 
revoke an offender’s probation because he “violated some terms of his 
probation rather than others.”
53
  Furthermore, the grant of such broad 
discretion, both in the imposition of conditions and ability to revoke, 
applies to SB 123 probation as well.
54
 
It is important to note that upon revocation there is a significant 
difference between SB 123 probation and “standard” probation.  
Offenders placed on standard probation are statutorily granted a jail-time 
credit in the event their probation is revoked and they are sentenced to 
confinement.
55
  Standard probationers who spend time in a residential 
facility, conservation camp, or community correctional residential 
services program, have the length of their sentences reduced by the 
amount of time they spent in these facilities.
56
  Courts are required to 
provide this jail-time credit to standard probationers facing revocation.
57
  
This is not the case for offenders sentenced to SB 123 probation.  “The 
amount of time spent participating . . . shall not be credited as service on 
the underlying prison sentence.”
58
  This legislative denial of a jail-time 
credit to SB 123 probationers (along with the mandatory nature of SB 
123) has created two classes of probationers in Kansas.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court has upheld this legislative distinction, ruling that it is not 
a violation of equal protection.
59
  As the court noted, offenders sentenced 
to SB 123 drug treatment comprise a separate class of probations and are 
therefore not treated equally by being denied “jail-time” credit when 
their SB 123 probation is revoked.
60
 
                                                          
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Id.  
 55.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21–6615(b) (West 2013).  
 56.  Id.  
 57.  See State v. Theis, 936 P.2d 710, 712 (Kan. 1997) (holding that, for standard probationers, 
“‘[j]ail-time credit’ must be determined by the sentencing court and included in the journal entry at 
the time the trial court sentences the defendant to confinement”); see also State v. King, 793 P.2d 
1267, 1269 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (“[Credit] for time served [is] . . . mandatory rather than 
discretionary and discloses legislative intent to give criminal defendants placed on probation credit 
for all time spent in custody during probationary periods.”). 
 58.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6604(n)(1) (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
 59.  State v. Preston, 195 P.3d 240, 245 (Kan. 2008); see also infra Part III.C.3. 
 60.  Id.  
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B. An Overview: Drug Courts 
1. Defining Drug Courts 
Having examined SB 123 probationary drug treatment in Kansas, it 
is important to compare the program to drug courts.  A “drug court” is a 
specialized court within a local court system that is designed to treat 
individuals addicted to drugs.
61
  “The mission of drug courts,” as 
established by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, “is to stop the abuse of 
alcohol and other drugs and other related criminal activity.”
62
  A drug 
court essentially uses “the criminal system to treat drug addiction 
through judicially monitored treatment rather than incarceration or 
probation.”
63
  This combination of probation, drug treatment, and 
continuous judicial supervision is the distinctive feature of drug courts.  
A drug court is composed of a team of professionals that includes: a 
judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, treatment providers, case managers, 
probation officers, and other law enforcement representatives.
64
  This 
team works with the participant throughout his or her time in drug court 
and each team member provides unique input regarding the participant’s 
progress.
65
  Within this team, the judge is essential.  The judge is not 
only the ultimate decision maker, but also an active participant who 
directs the process forward.
66
 
An offender enters drug court through a variety of adjudicatory 
pathways, for example pre-plea, pre-adjudication, or post-adjudication 
plea agreement.
67
  An offender generally participates in drug court for a 
general period of twelve to eighteen months and is expected to adhere to 
an individualized treatment plan, undergo weekly drug tests, and attend 
regular status hearings in front of the entire drug court team.
68
  The judge 
may impose positive or negative consequences—rewards for good 
                                                          
 61.  WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG COURT RES. CTR., PAINTING 
THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING 
COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.ndcrc.org/sites/default/files/pcp_report_final_and_official_july_2011.pdf. 
 62.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE TEN KEY COMPONENTS 1 
(2004), available at http://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/Key_Components.pdf [hereinafter 
TEN KEY COMPONENTS]. 
 63.  FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 17, at 41. 
 64.  HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 61, at 7.  
 65.  Id.  
 66.  See JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK, supra note 13, at 48. 
 67.  Id. at 33–35.  
 68.  HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 61, at 7.  
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behavior or punitive sanctions for noncompliance (such as failing a drug 
test or missing a status hearing).
69
 
2. Target Population 
Drug courts generally target drug-dependent (addicted)
70
 persons 
who have committed non-violent offenses because of their addiction.
71
  It 
is important to note that eligibility is not limited only to individuals who 
have committed drug-related offenses.
72
  Drug courts also seek 
individuals charged with offenses “which are determined to have been 
caused or influenced by their addiction such as theft, burglary, or 
forgery.”
73
  Such an offender is considered both “high need” and “high 
risk.”  “High need” refers to those disorders or impairments that “if 
treated, substantially reduce the likelihood of continued engagement in 
crime.”
74
  The most common need is usually substance dependence.
75
  
“High risk,” on the other hand, refers to the “likelihood that an offender 
                                                          
 69.  Id.  
 70.  “The essential feature of [s]ubstance [d]ependence [i.e. drug addiction] is a cluster of 
cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms indicating that the individual continues use of the 
substance despite significant substance-related problems.”  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDER, FOURTH EDITION 176 (4th ed. 1994).  Diagnostic 
criteria for substance dependence:  
A maladaptive pattern of substance use, leading to clinically significant impairment or 
distress, as manifested by three (or more) of the following [seven identifiers] occurring at 
any time in the same 12-month period: (1) tolerance, as defined by either . . . a need for 
markedly increased amounts of the substance to achieve intoxication . . . [or a] markedly 
diminished effect with continued use of the same amount of the substance; (2) 
withdrawal, as manifested by either . . . the characteristic withdrawal syndrome for the 
substance . . . [or] the same (or closely related) substance is taken to relieve or avoid 
withdrawal symptoms; (3) the substance is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer 
period than was intended; (4) there is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut 
down or control substance use; (5) a great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to 
obtain the substance . . . use the substance, or recover from its effects; (6) important 
social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or reduced because of 
substance use; (7) the substance use is continued despite knowledge of having a 
persistent or recurrent physical or psychological problem that is likely to have been 
caused or exacerbated by the substance. . . .   
Id. at 181. 
 71.  HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 61, at 7.  
 72.  What Are Drug Courts?, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, 
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). 
 73.  HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 61, at 7.  
 74.  DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, DRUG COURT PRACTITIONER FACT SHEET: TARGETING THE 
RIGHT PARTICIPANTS FOR ADULT DRUG COURTS 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/Targeting_Part_I.pdf. 
 75.  Id.  
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will not succeed on standard supervision and will continue to engage in 
the same pattern of behavior that got him or her into trouble in the first 
place.”
76
  Research has shown that drug courts: 
[T]end to have the most powerful effects for drug offenders who are 
both high risk and high need, meaning that they have serious substance 
abuse disorders and also have a history of a poor response to standard 
treatment and/or antisocial personality traits . . . .  If a drug court 
focuses on low-severity offenders, it is less likely to achieve 
meaningful cost savings for its community that would justify the 
additional expense and effort of the program.
77
 
3. The Ten Key Components 
Established by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, in collaboration 
with the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP), 
drug courts adhere to the Ten Key Components of Drug Courts.
78
  They 
are as follows: 
1. Drug courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with 
justice system case processing. 
2. Using a non-adversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel 
promote public safety while protecting participants’ due process rights. 
3. Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the 
drug court program. 
4. Drug courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, and 
other related treatment and rehabilitation services. 
5. Abstinence is monitored by frequent alcohol and other drug testing. 
6. A coordinated strategy governs drug court responses to participants’ 
compliance. 
7. Ongoing judicial interaction with each drug court participant is 
essential. 
8. Monitoring and evaluation measure the achievement of program 
goals and gauge effectiveness. 
                                                          
 76.  Id.  
 77.  JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK, supra note 13, at 32.  
 78.  TEN KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 62, at 1.  
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9. Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective drug court 
planning, implementation, and operations. 
10. Forging partnerships among drug courts, public agencies, and 
community-based organizations generates local support and enhances 
drug court program effectiveness.
79
 
The components listed above are no small thing.  They are evidence-
based best practices, with research confirming that “how well drug courts 
accomplish their goals depends upon how faithfully they adhere to the 
Ten Key Components.”
80
  Those drug courts that do not adhere to the 
Ten Key Components suffer from lower graduation rates, higher 
recidivism rates, and do not generate substantial cost savings.
81
  Indeed, 
these components have since become the national standard for drug 
courts.
82
  Further, any county seeking to establish or maintain their own 
drug court must adhere to the Ten Key Components to receive federal 
funding.
83
  Today, there are drug courts in every state, and many states 
have statutorily institutionalized drug courts along the NADCP model—
fully integrating them into their criminal justice systems.  Again, 
“institutionalization” can be described as the process by which states 
create a statewide network of drug courts that are stable, closely 
monitored, and reliably funded.
84
 
In Missouri, “[d]rug courts may be established by any circuit 
court . . . to provide an alternative for the judicial system to dispose of 
cases which stem from drug use.”
85
  Moreover, drug courts in Missouri 
“shall combine judicial supervision, drug testing and treatment of drug 
                                                          
 79.  Id. at iii. 
 80.  JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK, supra note 13, at 2.  
 81.  HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 61, at 14–15.  
 82.  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB No. 1121-0329, 
ADULT DRUG COURT DISCRETIONARY GRANT PROGRAM FY 2013 COMPETITIVE GRANT 
ANNOUNCEMENT 4–5 (2012), available at https://www.bja.gov/Funding/13DrugCourtSol.pdf.  
 83.  Id. at 5 (“Drug courts funded through this grant solicitation . . . must operate the adult drug 
court based on BJA’s and the National Association of Drug Court Professionals’ publication: 
Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components.”).   
The purpose of the Adult Drug Court Discretionary Grant Program . . . is to provide 
financial and technical assistance to states, state courts, local courts, units of local 
government, and Indian tribal governments to develop and implement drug courts that 
effectively integrate evidence-based substance abuse treatment, mandatory drug testing, 
sanctions, and incentives, and transitional services in a judicially supervised court setting 
with jurisdiction over substance-abusing offenders. 
Id. at 4.  
 84.  FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 17, at 2.  
 85.  MO. REV. STAT. § 478.001(1) (2012). 
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court participants.”
86
  Today there are currently seventy-four drug courts 
operating in the state (over 120 problem-solving courts in all),
87
 and 
these courts are funded by a combination federal, state, and local 
sources.
88
  Every drug court in Missouri is presided over by a judge, who 
is appointed by the majority of the judges in the circuit (county).
89
  Each 
circuit has discretion to establish its own conditions for drug court 
referral.
90
  That said, most drug courts in Missouri are pre-plea 
diversionary programs, meaning the offender’s charges are dismissed 
upon successful completion of the program.
91
 
In Arkansas, the legislature recognized “[t]here is a critical need for 
judicial intervention and support for effective treatment programs that 
reduce the incidence of drug use, drug addiction, and family separation 
due to parental substance abuse and drug-related crime.”
92
  In light of 
such a need, the legislature attempted to “enhance public safety by 
facilitating the creation, expansion, and coordination of drug court 
programs” across the state.
93
  Further, “the goals of the drug court 
program in [Arkansas] shall be consistent with the standards adopted by 
the United States Department of Justice and recommended by the 
National Association of Drug Court Professionals and shall include the 
[Ten Key Components].”
94
  Drug court practice in Arkansas is very 
similar to drug court practice in Missouri,
95
 and there are currently fifty-
one adult and juvenile drug courts operating across the state.
96







 (to list a few other states) have all 
instituted drug courts. 
                                                          
 86.  Id. 
 87.  NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, supra note 20.  
 88.  FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 17, at 29.  
 89.  MO. REV. STAT. § 478.003 (2012). 
 90.  Id. § 478.005(1). 
 91. FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 17, at 31. 
 92.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-98-302(a) (2013). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. § 16-98-302(b)(1)–(10). 
 95.  See, e.g., id. § 16-98-302(c)(1)–(2), §16-98-303(d)(1)–(3). 
 96.  NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, supra note 20. 
 97.  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1204 (West 2013). 
 98.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 166/15 (West 2013). 
 99.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 471.1 (West 2013). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Problems with an Overly Narrow Target Population 
The purpose of SB 123 is to address the significant problem of 
recidivism among drug-addicted offenders.
100
  The Kansas Supreme 
Court noted in Preston that the Kansas Sentencing Commission had 
analogized this particular problem to a “revolving door.”
101
  The use of 
this analogy by the commission is an acknowledgment of the fact that 
substance-dependent offenders in Kansas are continuously in and out of 
prison as a result of their addictions.  Acknowledging this predicament in 
word, however, is not the same as acknowledging it in action.  As 
described above, SB 123 is extremely limited in scope—primarily in 
three ways.  First, only offenders convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance are eligible for the program.  Second, within this already-
narrow category of offenders, only first-time and second-time felony 
possession offenders are eligible.
102
  Lastly, the sentence for a third or 
subsequent felony possession conviction shall be imprisonment.
103
  
Herein lies the problem with SB 123: the rhetoric behind the law is 
subverted by its own restrictions. 
The effectiveness of SB 123 in breaking the recidivistic cycle of 
drug-addicted offenders is seriously undermined by limiting eligibility to 
only those offenders convicted of drug possession at the exclusion of all 
other criminal offenders.  This limitation ignores the large population of 
other offenders whose criminal acts were driven by drug dependency.  It 
is important to understand that drug-dependent offenders do not practice 
a restrained criminality.  They commit other offenses besides mere 
possession; and, such offenses are likely spread across the criminal 
spectrum.
104
  After all, serious drug use and negative behavioral patterns 
                                                          
 100.  State v. Preston, 195 P.3d 240, 244 (Kan. 2008).  
 101.  Id.  
 102.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21–6805(f)(1) (West 2013); see also SB 123 OPERATIONS MANUAL, 
supra note 26, at ch. 4-2.  
 103.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6805(f)(1) (West 2013).  
 104.  NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 1, at 2 (“Substance misuse 
and addiction are overwhelming factors in all types of crime, not just alcohol and drug law 
violations.  Thirty-seven percent of federal, state and local prison and jail inmates in 2006 were 
serving time for committing a violent crime as their controlling offense; of these inmates, 77.5 
percent were substance involved.  Those serving time for property crimes comprise 19.2 percent of 
the inmate population; 83.4 percent were substance involved.  Those whose controlling offense was 
a supervision violation, public order offense, immigration offense or weapon offense comprise 13.3 
percent of the inmate population; 76.9 percent were substance involved.”); see also DrugFacts: 
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often go hand-in-hand.
105
  For example, to continue supporting his habit, 
an individual suffering from addiction may resort to theft, robbery, or 
burglary.  While under the influence, such a person may drive while 
impaired or assault another individual.  Simply put, people addicted to 
drugs do not engage in a limited brand of crime.  Limiting drug treatment 
to only possession offenders, implicitly and incorrectly assumes that 
individuals who possess illegal drugs are the only offenders addicted to 
drugs.  Recently, a number of Kansas judges were consulted to voice 
their opinion regarding SB 123.
106
  Discussing the fact that SB 123 is 
limited to only the offense of possession: 
Almost half of the judges interviewed were . . . concerned about 
offenders who, in their views, should receive SB 123 because of the 
nature of their substance abuse problems but cannot due to the fact that 
their criminal history makes them ineligible for inclusion under SB 
123.  One judge stated that there are many cases where individuals 
commit more serious crimes where the offender is an addict and 
they are not eligible for SB 123 treatment because of the 
seriousness of the current charge, but those people are the ones 
who probably need the most help because they are committing 
serious crimes to feed their addiction.  A few judges reported that 
there are a group of offenders that commit non-drug related crimes and 
                                                          
Treatment for Drug Abusers in the Criminal Justice System, DRUGABUSE.GOV (July 2006), 
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/treatment-drug-abusers-in-criminal-justice-system 
(noting that “the connection between drug abuse and crime is well known”); DrugFacts: 
Understanding Drug Abuse and Addiction, DRUGABUSE.GOV (Nov. 2012),  
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/understanding-drug-abuse-addiction 
(“Brain imaging studies of drug addicted individuals show changes in areas of the brain that are 
critical to judgment, decision making, learning and memory, and behavior control.  Together, these 
changes can drive an abuser to seek out and take drugs compulsively despite adverse, even 
devastating consequences—that is the nature of addiction.” (emphasis added)).  See generally Ruben 
D. Baler & Nora D. Volkow, Drug Addiction: The Neurobiology of Disrupted Self-Control, 12 
TRENDS MOLECULAR MED. 559, 559 (2006) (noting that there is an “intimate relationship between 
the circuits disrupted by abused drugs and those that underlie self-control,” and that a “fundamental 
motivational shift takes place whereby a drug is no longer taken to derive pleasure from it but to 
satiate intense craving and to relieve the distress of not having the drug”). 
 105.  Daniel H. Angres, The Temperament and Character Inventory in Addiction Treatment, 8 J. 
LIFELONG LEARNING & PSYCHIATRY 187, 188–89 (2010) (“A study published in the American 
Journal of Psychiatry revealed that 60% of subjects with substance use disorders had personality 
disorders. . . .  There are a number of different views regarding personality and addiction. . . .  
[S]ubstance abuse often occurs within the context of a deviant peer group and antisocial behaviors 
might be shaped and reinforced by social norms . . . .  Patients with . . . antisocial personality 
disorder and borderline personality disorder, have been suggested to have the highest prevalence of 
addiction . . . .”). 
 106.  DON STEMEN & ANDRES F. RENGIFO, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING POLICIES FOR DRUG 
OFFENDERS: EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF KANSAS SENATE BILL 123, FINAL REPORT, 148–
49 (2012), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238012.pdf [hereinafter SB 123 
EVALUATION].  
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who are in serious need of substance abuse treatment as well as those 
included under SB 123.
107
 
The goal of SB 123 to “address more effectively the revolving door 
of drug addicts in the state prisons” is further sterilized by limiting 
eligibility to only those first-time or second-time felony possession 
offenders.  To stop the revolving door of recidivism, the criminal justice 
system must target persons actually caught up in its swirling vortex.  SB 
123’s eligibility limitations keep the program from reaching the people 
truly caught up in the justice system, and they ignore the fact that these 
individuals (because of their addiction) are at much greater risk for 
having more than one or two felony possession convictions.  In its study 
on the feasibility of drug courts in Kansas, the NCSC noted this problem: 
Kansas would see a greater cost benefit if SB 123 programs . . . were 
available to a broader range of offenders.  By accepting only first and 
second time felony possession offenders for drug possession, the 
programs are not catching the individuals who are caught in the 
revolving door of substance abuse and criminal behavior.
108
 
It can hardly be said that a person facing a first or second felony 
possession offense is caught up in a cycle of criminal justice 
appearances.  These are the people who, more likely than not, need 
probationary drug treatment the least.  Even more problematic is the fact 
that when a person is convicted of possession for a third or subsequent 
time, the presumptive sentence is imprisonment, and the court “shall” 
sentence the offender to prison.
109
  SB 123 exacerbates the very problem 
it seeks to solve!  Rather than pulling offenders out of the revolving door, 
SB 123 throws them back in. 
Providing only a single opportunity at drug treatment further 
strangles the effectiveness of SB 123.  This limitation fails to consider 
that addicted individuals are likely to relapse multiple times;
110
 and, it 
                                                          
 107.  Id. at 161–62. 
 108.  FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 17, at 9–10.  
 109.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6805(f)(1) (West 2013). 
 110.  NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUGS, BRAINS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE SCIENCE OF 
ADDICTION 26 (2010), available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/sciofaddiction.pdf 
[hereinafter THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION]; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 70, at 189 
(“The course of [s]ubstance [d]ependence is variable.  Although relatively brief and self-limited 
episodes may occur . . . the course is usually chronic, lasting years, with periods of exacerbation and 
partial or full remission.  There may be periods of heavy intake and severe problems, periods of total 
abstinence, and times of nonproblematic use of the substance, sometimes lasting for months. . . .  
During the first 12 months after the onset of remission, the individual is particularly vulnerable to 
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often takes multiple attempts at treatment for these individuals to get 
permanently clean.
111
  After all, drug addiction is considered a chronic 
disease characterized by compulsive drug seeking and use.
112
  
Considering the chronic nature of drug addiction, “[R]elapsing to drug 
abuse is not only possible, but likely. . . .  Treatment of chronic diseases 
involves changing deeply imbedded behaviors . . . .”
113
  This is not to say 
that repeat offenders, previously unsuccessful in probationary drug 
treatment, should be given grace ad nauseam.  However, providing only 
one opportunity at drug treatment ignores the reality of drug addiction 
and only undermines the goals of SB 123. 
1. Comparing SB 123’s Eligibility and Admission Requirements to 
Drug Court Practice 
The eligibility restrictions and limitations of SB 123 are also 
contrary to drug court practice, which has been proven effective in 
reducing “recidivism and substance abuse among high-risk substance 
abusing offenders and increase[ing] their likelihood of successful 
rehabilitation . . . .”
114
  The first key component of drug court provides a 
broad mission statement: “The mission of drug courts is to stop the abuse 
of alcohol and other drugs and related criminal activity.”
115
  The phrase 
“related criminal activity” necessarily implies any criminal activity 
related to drug abuse and addiction.  This mission statement recognizes 
that the problem is not a particular brand of crime, but a particular brand 
of criminal.  Importantly, drug courts are not limited to a certain type of 
offense; they are only limited to a certain type of offender—the offender 
that is addicted to drugs. 
Drug court eligibility is not limited to only those offenders convicted 
of possession.
116
  Drug courts generally target non-violent misdemeanor 
or felony offenders where drugs were the underlying cause or motivator 
                                                          
having a relapse.” (emphasis added)). 
 111.  See JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK, supra note 13, at 68–70. (relating the clinical understanding 
that addiction recovery is a lengthy process, and “[i]f it took months or years to lay down drug-
related pathways, then it could be expected to take months or years to lay down newer pathways that 
can compete effectively against drug or alcohol abuse”).   
 112.  THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION, supra note 110, at 5; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 
70, at 189. 
 113.   THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION, supra note 110, at 26. 
 114.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 82, at 4. 
 115.  TEN KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 62, at 1.  
 116.  FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 17, at 8 (see chart comparing SB 123 to drug courts). 
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of the crime.
117
  The NCSC noted that, “less than one-third of prior 
convictions in all courts were drug-related; this indicates that [drug 
court] participants are involved in a wider range of criminal activity.”
118
  
The reasoning behind this broad inclusion of any drug-addicted offender, 
as explained above, is grounded in extensive research.  The NCSC 
reported further that “[r]esearch shows definitively that drug courts are 
most effective for high-risk / high-needs offenders.  Most high-risk / 
high-needs individuals have multiple convictions, are highly addictive 
and have failed at treatment before.”
119
 
Because most dual high-risk and high-need individuals have 
previously failed drug treatment, many states that have institutionalized 
drug courts allow judges to determine whether an offender will get more 
than one chance at drug court treatment.  In Missouri, the only conditions 
imposed upon eligibility of drug-addicted offenders are that the offenders 
be non-violent and that the referral to drug court be agreed upon by both 
parties.
120
  Similarly, Arkansas denies drug court admission only to 
individuals previously convicted of sexual or violent offenses.
121
  
Oklahoma requires that drug-addicted offenders have no violent offenses 
within the previous ten years,
122
 admit to having an addiction to drugs,
123
 
volunteer for the program,
124
 get approval from the prosecuting attorney, 
and subsequently appear before a judge who determines admission into 
the drug court program.
125
  The point here is not to catalog drug court 
admission criteria, but rather to show how many states do not deny 
admission into drug court to those who have previously failed drug 
treatment.  Kansas’s one-shot rule denies courts the discretion to 
determine the best sentence for each offender. 
The eligibility and admission provisions of SB 123 not only 
undermine the aspirations of the law, but are also contrary to effective 
drug court practice.  In light of these problematic eligibility restrictions, 
SB 123’s eligibility scheme should be replaced in the event drug courts 
                                                          
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Id. at 46. 
 119.  Id. at 9. 
 120.  MO. REV. STAT. § 478.005(1) (2012). 
 121.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-98-303(c)(1) (2013). 
 122.  OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.2(A)(2) (2013). 
 123.   Id. § 471.2(A)(5).  The offender may also be eligible if he “appears to have” or is “known 
to have” a drug addiction; or, his arrest is “based upon an offense eligible for the drug court 
program.”  Id.  
 124.  Id. § 471.2(B). 
 125.  Id. § 471.2(D). 
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are institutionalized across the state.  Even if SB 123 is used as a basis 
for institutionalized drug courts in Kansas, the law should be expanded to 
target a larger population.  SB 123 drug treatment should focus not only 
on offenders heading towards the revolving door, but also on offenders 
already trapped therein. 
B. The Problem with Lacking Continuous Judicial Supervision 
SB 123 is lacking in another significant way: there is no continuous 
judicial involvement.  The first key component of drug court states that 
“[d]rug courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with 
justice system case processing.”
126
  In drug courts, “the treatment 
experience begins in the courtroom and continues through the 
participant’s drug court involvement.  In other words, drug court is a 
comprehensive therapeutic experience, only part of which takes place in 
a designated treatment setting.  The treatment and criminal justice 
professionals are members of the therapeutic team.”
127
  Drug courts 
require that each team member play an active role in a participant’s 
progress.
128
  Studies have shown that when any one of these team 




Moreover, drug court offenders regularly appear and give progress 
reports to judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, 
treatment providers, and other criminal justice personnel.  These regular, 
status hearings have been shown to be a critical aspect of drug court 
effectiveness.
130
  Importantly, such hearings are non-adversarial.
131
  To 
be sure, courts require that participants actually participate in treatment 
and sanctions are imposed for non-compliance.  However, as part of the 
treatment program, courts also understand that addiction takes time to 
conquer—participants are going to have issues with compliance and 
                                                          
 126.  TEN KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 62, at 1. 
 127.  Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 128.  MARLOWE, supra note 15, at 4; see also TEN KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 62, at 7.   
 129.  MARLOWE, supra note 15, at 4. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  TEN KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 62, at 3 (“To facilitate an individual’s progress in 
treatment, the prosecutor and defense counsel must shed their traditional adversarial courtroom 
relationship and work together as a team.  Once a defendant is accepted into the drug court program, 
the team’s focus is on the participant’s recovery and law-abiding behavior—not on the merits of the 
pending case.”). 
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relapse.
132
  Thus, drug courts combine the “hammer” of the justice 
system with this therapeutic approach.  This approach holds the 
participant appropriately accountable while, at the same time, providing 
needed treatment services. 
Some aspects of SB 123 are similar to drug court, for example, state-
provided drug treatment, and the ability to impose sanctions.  Outside of 
sanctions and the revocation process, SB 123 lacks judicial involvement 
in the treatment process.  This is extremely significant because judicial 
involvement is the critical piece of drug court practice.  Without 
continuous judicial supervision, the offender lacks a major external 
motivation to change.  Even though the threat of judicial sanction is 
present, such sanctions sit outside the treatment process, are not 
immediately available, and are imposed by a judge not intimately 
involved with the offender’s case. 
C. SB 123’s Mandatory Admission and Revocation Requirements and 
the Denial of  Jail-Time Credit 
As shown above, SB 123 requires that those offenders who meet the 
eligibility and admission criteria within K.S.A. section 21-6824 must be 
admitted into the program.
133
  Whether the offender desires probationary 
drug treatment is irrelevant.  While in the program, offenders are subject 
to sanctions if they fail to abide by the terms of their probation or 
treatment.
134
  Offenders are discharged if they commit a new felony.
135
  
Also, if an offender “fails to participate in or has a pattern of intentional 
conduct that demonstrates the defendant’s refusal to comply with or 
participate in the treatment program . . . the defendant shall be subject to 
. . . revocation pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A. § 22-3716.”
136
  
Moreover, as the Kansas Supreme Court has held, these are not the only 
two circumstances for which an offender may be discharged from the 
program.
137
  Importantly, offenders do not receive jail-time credit for 
time spent in treatment if they are terminated and their underlying 
sentence is imposed.
138
  The mandatory admission and revocation 
                                                          
 132.  See supra note 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 133.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6824(c) (West 2013). 
 134.  Id. § 22-3716(g). 
 135.  Id. § 21-6824(f)(1)(A). 
 136.  Id. § 21-6604(n)(2). 
 137.  State v. Gumfory, 135 P.3d 1191, 1196 (Kan. 2006). 
 138.  Id. § 21-6604(n)(1), amended by 2013 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 76, Sec. 1. 
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requirements of SB 123, coupled with the law’s denial of jail-time credit, 
are problematic for two reasons.  These provisions increase the rate of 
offender recidivism and generate serious due process concerns. 
1. The Effect of SB 123’s Mandatory Admission and Revocation 
Requirements on Recidivism 
SB 123 is counterproductive in that, while it is too narrow, it is also 
too broad.  As mentioned above, the law is too narrow because SB 123 
drug treatment is limited to those convicted of felony drug possession for 
the first or second time.  Because admission into SB 123 is mandatory, 
the law is too broad at the same time.  Today, unlike ten years ago, all 
“high risk” first- or second-time possession offenders are forced into SB 
123 probationary drug treatment.
139
  Once in the program, offenders face 
a probation involving greater supervision, more demanding 
requirements, and more stringent revocation guidelines.  The mandatory 
nature of SB 123 thus becomes problematic. 
“Net-widening” is a phenomenon that occurs when a non-prison 
sentence such as probation actually increases, rather than decreases, 
prison sentences.
140
  Net-widening can occur anytime a jurisdiction 
places more offenders into probation programs with increased 
requirements and additional supervision.
141
  The more jurisdictions 
monitor and restrict probationers, the more likely it is that violations will 
be discovered.
142
  Because more violations are discovered, jurisdictions 
                                                          
 139.  Id. § 21-6824(c).  
 140.  Michelle S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of Mass 
Incarceration, 35 L. & POL’Y 51, 52–53, 56 (2013).  
 141.  See id. at 52 (noting that, despite the positive misconception that probation decreases prison 
sentences, research on probation has historically found that probation “expand[s] the ‘net’ of formal 
social control”).   
[R]esearchers [have] often found that expansions in probation increase[] overall 
punishment by drawing in more low-level cases (who might otherwise have been 
sentenced with community service hours, fines, or other . . . less invasive punishments) 
and [make] these individuals more likely to be incarcerated in the future due to increased 
restrictions and monitoring.   
Id.  
 142.  Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, 20 CRIME & JUST. 99, 101 (1996) 
(“The goals of diverting offenders from prison and providing tough, rigorously enforced sanctions in 
the community have proven largely incompatible.  A major problem, and it has repeatedly been 
shown to characterize intensive supervision programs, is that close surveillance of offenders reveals 
higher levels of technical violations than are discovered in less intensive sanctions.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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revoke probation and impose underlying prison sentences more often.
143
 
Considering the general qualities of the typical possession offender 
in light of the increased probationary standards of SB 123, it becomes 
clear that net-widening will likely occur as the rate of violations and 
revocations increase.
144
  The reason is simple.  Drug possession offenders 
are more likely to have problems with substance abuse and addiction 
than other offenders.  Obviously, because such offenders are at a greater 
risk of using illicit drugs, they are at high risk of violating the terms of 
their probation.  The possession offenders placed in SB 123, therefore, 
are at a greater risk of being revoked, especially because revocation is 
mandatory for certain offenses.  
This has already proven to be the case for SB 123.  In 2012, an 
extensive study by Don Stemen and Andres Rengifo of the National 
Institute of Justice examined the effectiveness of SB 123.
145
  The study 
acknowledged the net-widening effect of SB 123’s mandatory admission 
requirements and provided this damning conclusion: 
SB 123 [has] a limited impact on recidivism.  SB 123 increase[s] the 
likelihood of recidivism compared to court services and ha[s] no 
significant impact on recidivism compared to community corrections or 
prison.  The impact relative to court services may not be surprising; 
most failures on probation are the result of revocations and SB 123 
increase[s] the level of surveillance and control drug possessors were 




Therefore, rather than decrease the rates of recidivism and the 
subsequent imposition of prison sentences, SB 123 actually increases the 
likelihood that a possession offender will reoffend and be sent to prison. 
2. Due Process Concerns Regarding the Denial of a Jail-Time Credit 
Apart from the concern regarding SB 123 probationer success rates, 
mandatory admission into SB 123 probation is disconcerting for another 
                                                          
 143.  Id. (noting that there is no reason to believe offenders in intensive supervision programs 
commit more violations; the reason for higher rates of violations and subsequent revocations is that 
offenders are more closely monitored, which increases the chance that violations will be discovered). 
 144.  See SB 123 EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 205 (“[M]ore drug possessors are now subject 
to stricter conditions and greater surveillance than prior to implementation of SB 123; a situation that 
may be leading to higher rates of revocation.”).  
 145.  Id. at 4–5. 
 146.  Id. at 206. 
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reason.  Offenders placed in SB 123 will not be given a jail-time credit in 
the event their probation is revoked.  As mentioned above, the right to 
jail-time credit is statutory for “standard” probationers in Kansas.
147
  In 
the event an offender’s probation is revoked, the court must reduce the 
offender’s prison sentence by the amount of time spent in confinement 
during his or her probation.
148
  SB 123 probationers, however, do not 
receive the same treatment.  In creating this separate class of 
probationers, the Kansas Legislature decided that time spent in an SB 
123 program will not count towards the underlying prison sentence.
149
  
This distinction between standard probationers and SB 123 probationers 
creates constitutional concerns involving offenders’ due process rights. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteen Amendment
150
 requires that 
each state afford procedural protections before the government may 
deprive an individual of a “life,” “liberty,” or “property” interest.
151
  The 
basic due process question is: when the government deprives an 
individual of a life, liberty, or property interest, what process is due?
152
  
This question allows for a flexible response—it requires procedural 
protections as each particular situation demands.
153
  The Kansas Supreme 
Court put it this way: “The fundamental requirement of due process is 
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner. . . .  A due process violation exists only when a claimant is able 
to establish that he or she was denied a specific procedural protection to 
which he or she was entitled.”
154
 
An individual charged with a crime has an obvious liberty interest at 
stake when facing potential incarceration and is entitled to due process 
protections.  Such protections include notice and an opportunity to be 
                                                          
 147.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6615 (West 2013). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. § 21-6604(n)(1). 
 150.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 151.  Id.; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (“The essence of due process is the 
requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case against him and 
[the] opportunity to meet it.’” (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 171–72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).  
 152.  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process 
applies, the question remains what process is due.”). 
 153.  Id.; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (“‘[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’” (quoting 
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961))). 
 154.  In re J.D.C., 159 P.3d 974, 982 (Kan. 2007).  See also Winston v. State Dept. of Soc. 
Rehab. Servs., 49 P.3d 1274, 1283–84 (Kan. 2002) (providing the standard for evaluating procedural 
due process claims). 
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heard at a fair and adequate trial.
155
  Due process protections, however, 
do not end at trial.  Criminal defendants are also entitled to due process 
at sentencing.  According to the Supreme Court, “it is now clear that the 
sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.”
156
  Further, at sentencing, 
“free-standing due process constitutes the almost exclusive source of 
constitutionally mandated procedural rights.”
157
  According to one 
scholar’s summary: 
Due process governs the range of conduct and type of information that 
may be considered by the sentencing judge, the need for notifying the 
defendant of the information that the judge will consider in making the 
sentencing decision, the need to ensure that information relied upon is 
accurate, and the need to provide the defendant with an opportunity to 
be heard and to offer his own evidence.
158
 
Indeed, due process today: 
[R]ecognizes that adversary procedural rights are needed at 
[sentencing], just as at the criminal trial, because the length and terms 
of the sentence implicate the defendant’s liberty interest no less than 
conviction itself.  The judge’s determination of the length of the 
sentence, or her choice between a prison term, home confinement, or 




Because of judicial discretion in sentencing and the liberty interest at 
stake, criminal defendants have the right to be heard in a meaningful way 
                                                          
 155.  State v. Wilkinson, 9 P.3d 1, 5 (Kan. 2000); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 
(1972) (noting that “[f]or more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has 
been clear: ‘[p]arties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they 
may enjoy that right they must first be notified’” (citing Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863))); 
McGrath, 341 U.S. at 171–72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“No better instrument has been devised 
for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him 
and opportunity to meet it.”); Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 18–19 (2006) (discussing the “impressive degree” of due process protections afforded 
to criminal defendants at trial and the origins of those protections).   
 156.  Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).  “Even though the defendant has no 
substantive right to a particular sentence within the range authorized by statute, the sentencing is a 
critical stage of the criminal proceeding. . . .  The defendant has a legitimate interest in the character 
of the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he may have no right to object to a 
particular result of the sentencing process.”  Id. 
 157.  Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme 
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 394 (2001). 
 158.  Id. at 393. 
 159.  Kuckes, supra note 155, at 19.  
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at sentencing, and are therefore provided due process rights at the 
sentencing stage. 
The mandatory admission requirement of SB 123 effectively 
eliminates an offender’s opportunity to be heard at sentencing by 
eliminating the judge’s discretion to sentence.  As noted above, the 
statute requires courts to sentence first- and second-time felony 
possession offenders to drug treatment.
160
  When the judge has no choice 
but to sentence a possession offender to SB 123 treatment, the offender 
has no voice in the matter.  Whether an offender is adamantly opposed to 
drug treatment, desires standard probation, or wishes to serve the 
underlying prison sentence is of no consequence.  SB 123 probationary 
drug treatment is mandatory.  The possession-offender eligible for SB 
123, therefore, has no opportunity to be heard at sentencing. 
Does the denial of an offender’s right to be heard at sentencing 
through the imposition of a mandatory sentence constitute a denial of due 
process?  The answer at first appears to be “no.”  Due process attacks 
against mandatory sentences have been made numerous times in the past, 
and such attacks have often focused on mandatory impositions of 
minimum prison sentences following a repeated or aggravated offense.
161
  
Offenders attack mandatory prison sentences with the argument that  
they denied the judge discretion to suspend or reduce the sentence, and 
(as the argument goes) thus deprived the offender due process at 
sentencing.
162
  This argument has generally lost as courts have 
consistently held that mandatory sentences are constitutionally valid and 
do not violate defendants’ due process rights.
163
  The driving justification 
                                                          
 160.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6824(c)(1) (West 2013). 
 161.  See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 395 F. App’x 908 (3d Cir. 2010) (mandatory minimum 
prison sentence imposed for offenses involving crack cocaine); United States. v. Nolan, 342 F. 
App’x 368, 371 (10th Cir. 2009) (mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment for 
any individual who is statutorily classified as an “armed career criminal”); United States v. Santos, 
64 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (mandatory thirty year minimum prison sentence for using a silenced 
firearm during drug trafficking crime), vacated, 516 U.S. 1156 (1996); State v. Spain, 953 P.2d 1004 
(Kan. 1998) (mandatory term of forty years imprisonment for premeditated first-degree murder); 
State v. DeCourcy, 580 P.2d 86 (Kan. 1978) (mandatory minimum prison sentence for carrying 
firearm during commission of certain crimes). 
 162.  See, e.g., State v. Freeman, 574 P.2d 950 (Kan. 1978) (defendant argued that mandatory 
minimum sentence of 5 years imprisonment denied judge discretion to grant a lesser sentence, thus 
constituting a denial of defendant’s due process rights).  
 163.  See, e.g., State v. Boldridge, 57 P.3d 8, 20 (Kan. 2002) (holding that a “hard 50” sentence 
does not violate a defendant’s due process rights); Decourcy, 580 P.2d at 88 (mandatory minimum 
prison sentence for carrying a firearm during the commission of a certain offense does not violate 
defendant’s due process rights); see also 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2005 (2013) (“A statute 
providing a mandatory sentence . . . is generally constitutional . . . .”).  See generally Annotation, 
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behind such approval arises out of the legislature’s power to define 
punishment for specific crimes.
164
  After all:  
The power of the legislature to fix the punishment for crime is 
practically unlimited; it may take property, it may take liberty, it may 
take life, in punishment for an infraction of the law, so long as it does 
not in so doing infringe or violate any of the guaranties secured to all 
citizens by the Constitution.
165
   
Indeed, the Kansas Supreme Court has noted that “fixing and prescribing 




It is important to note, however, that mandatory sentences today are 
not fixed, one-size-fits-all sentences in which a judge has absolutely no 
discretion—that is, they are not truly mandatory.  Rather, “mandatory 
sentence” generally refers to a sentence that falls within a legislatively 
provided minimum and maximum sentencing range to which the judge 
must abide.
167
  Such sentencing provisions merely reduce the amount of 
discretion a judge may utilize at sentencing.
168
  Though truly mandatory 
fixed sentences were a part of our nation’s early history, “[m]odern 
mandatory sentence enhancement legislation differs from the fixed 
sentences imposed [historically].  Most of the current laws do not set the 
penalties for criminal offenses themselves, but instead require 
substantially increased punishment when a specified aggravating 
circumstance exists in connection with the commission of a crime.”
169
 
                                                          
Constitutionality of Statute Which Makes Specified Punishment or Penalty Mandatory and Permits 
No Exercise of Discretion on Part of Court or Jury, 83 A.L.R. 1362 (2013) [hereinafter 
Constitutionality of Statute]. 
 164.  DeCourcy, 580 P.2d at 88. 
 165.  Constitutionality of Statute, supra note 163.  
 166.  DeCourcy, 580 P.2d at 88. 
 167.  Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of 
Determinant Sentencing Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 61, 69 (1993).   
 168.  In Kansas there are two sentencing guideline “grids” that judges use during sentencing.  
One grid covers nondrug crimes (K.S.A. § 21-6804) while the other grid covers drug crimes (K.S.A. 
§ 21-6805).  Though there are differences, both grids function the same.  To use the nondrug grid as 
an example: “The sentencing guidelines grid for nondrug crimes as provided in this section defines 
presumptive punishments for felony convictions, subject to the sentencing court’s discretion to enter 
a departure sentence.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6804(d) (West 2013) (emphasis added).  
Furthermore, “The sentencing court has discretion to sentence at any place within the sentencing 
range.  In the usual case it is recommended that the sentencing judge select the center of the range 
and reserve the upper and lower limits for aggravating and mitigating factors insufficient to warrant 
a departure.”  Id. § 21-6804(e)(1) (emphasis added). 
 169.  Lowenthal, supra note 167, at 69.  
A wide variety of circumstances trigger enhanced penalties under the statutes.  Most 
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Though mandatory admission to SB 123 drug treatment does not 
appear constitutionally problematic at first, SB 123 generates due process 
concerns distinguishable from those commonly raised against mandatory 
prison sentences.  Unlike most “mandatory” sentences, the imposition of 
SB 123 probation is truly mandatory for eligible offenders.  With most 
mandatory prison sentences, the sentencing judge utilizes discretion 
between the mandatory minimum and maximum possible sentences.  
Even though discretion is limited, it is not completely eliminated.  SB 
123, on the other hand, imposes a truly fixed sentence.  According to the 
statute, once a first or second felony possession has been deemed 
eligible, the judge has no discretion. 
The biggest difference between the mandatory prison sentences 
mentioned above and SB 123 is that SB 123 statutorily requires 
probationary drug treatment.  This becomes constitutionally significant 
because of several factors.  First, there is a greater likelihood that 
possession offenders placed in SB 123 drug treatment will be drug-
dependent offenders.  Second, offenders face increased supervision while 
in SB 123 drug treatment.  Third, SB 123 probationers face potential 
sanctions that deprive them of liberty;
170
 and, any sanction involving 
confinement will not count as a jail-time credit against the underlying 
sentence for offenders removed from SB 123 probation.
171
  When one 
considers these factors, especially the nature of the SB 123 probationers 
themselves, denying offenders a voice at sentencing becomes 
problematic. Such a denial is problematic because offenders face a 
deprivation of liberty that goes beyond fair punishment. 
As mentioned above, addicted individuals will likely relapse multiple 
times, and, consequently, repeatedly violate their probation.
172
  As a 
consequence of these violations, a drug-addicted offender forced into SB 
123 could be sanctioned with house arrest, long-term inpatient drug 
treatment, and even 60 days in the county jail for failing to stay clean, 
                                                          
jurisdictions have adopted provisions requiring substantially longer prison sentences 
when a person possesses or uses a dangerous weapon during the commission of an 
offense.  Enhanced sentences for repeat felony offenders are also common.  Other 
common targets of enhancement legislation are persons who possess or distribute 
prohibited drugs exceeding a specified weight or amount, those who commit crimes 
against vulnerable victims such as children or elderly persons, and those who commit 
crimes while released from custody for other offenses. 
Id. at 70. 
 170.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3716(g) (West 2013). 
 171.  Id. § 21-6604(n)(1).  
 172.  See supra note 141 and accompanying text; THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION, supra note 110, 
at 26. 
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submit a drug test, or adequately participate in treatment.
173
  If, at any 
time following a violation, an offender “fails to participate in or has a 
pattern of intentional conduct that demonstrates the [offender’s] refusal 
to comply with or participate in the treatment program,” then the 
offender could be removed from SB 123 and their underlying sentence 
imposed without credit for time already spent in confinement.
174
  Drug-
addicted offenders are also at a much greater risk for picking up 
additional felonies.
175
  Likewise, if an individual is addicted to drugs, 
there is a greater likelihood that they will be caught possessing drugs, 
and in this instance, revocation is mandatory.
176
 
In a remarkably detailed section regarding addiction and treatment, 
the Drug Court Judicial Benchbook (developed by the National Drug 
Court Institute) noted this low likelihood of success for drug offenders 
sentenced to drug treatment as a condition of their probation: 
Unfortunately, drug offenders are notorious for failing to comply with 
their conditions to attend substance abuse treatment.  Unless they are 
intensively supervised by the court, approximately twenty-five percent 
of drug offenders who have been ordered to attend substance abuse 
treatment will fail to enroll in treatment; and, among those who do 




Such concerns about the low chance of success in SB 123 drug 
treatment should be evident to all at the sentencing stage—especially the 
offender.  As a number of Kansas courtroom actors have reported, 
“[A]lmost everyone who has participated [in SB 123] has been back in 
                                                          
 173.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3716(g) (West 2013). 
 174.  Id. § 21-6604(n)(1)–(2) (2013), amended by 2013 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 76, Sec. 1. 
 175.  The National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence notes on its website that “[t]he 
use of illegal drugs is often associated with murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny / theft, serious motor vehicle offenses with dangerous consequences, arson and hate crimes.  
Without question, drug use and criminality are closely linked.”  Drugs and Crime, NCADD, 
http://www.ncadd.org/index.php/learn-about-drugs/drugs-and-crime (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); see 
also THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION, supra note 110, at 7 (“The initial decision to take drugs is mostly 
voluntary.  However, when drug abuse takes over, a person’s ability to exert self control can become 
seriously impaired.  Brain imaging studies from drug-addicted individuals show physical changes in 
areas of the brain that are critical to judgment, decision making . . . and behavior control.  Scientist 
believe that these changes alter the way the brain works, and may help explain the compulsive and 
destructive behaviors of addiction.” (emphasis added)).   
 176.  See SB 123 EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 15 (recommending that lawmakers revise SB 
123’s revocation practices to reflect the likelihood that participants will relapse).   
 177.  JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK, supra note 13, at 65. 
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court for [drugs] . . . .”
178
 
SB 123’s sanctioning provisions, the statute’s suspension of jail-time 
credit, and the characteristics of offenders placed into the SB 123 
program create this overarching problem: SB 123 probationers face a 
substantial risk of being overly punished, with a substantial possibility 
that offenders will serve more time in confinement than is warranted by 
the underlying prison sentence for drug possession.
179
  When an offender 
could very likely face more time in confinement than the underlying 
prison sentence, then denying that offender a chance to be heard at 
sentencing is of serious concern.  By mandating that an eligible first-time 
or second-time felony possession offender be sentenced to SB 123 
probation, regardless of his or her inappropriateness for treatment, the 
legislature effectively sets the offender up for a protracted course of 
sanction and eventual revocation.  This results in an unfair amount of 
punishment.  This is a denial of due process. 
To be sure, the imposition of standard probation may rightfully be 
considered a legislative “grace” given to the offender.
180
  Kansas Courts 
have repeatedly stated that “probation from service of a prison sentence 
is an act of grace by the sentencing judge and . . . is granted as a 
privilege, not as a matter of right.”
181
  However, when another “type” of 
probation, involving greater requirements and an increased amount of 
supervision, is forced on a group of individuals facing a great risk of 
failure, it can hardly be considered grace any longer.  It is not enough to 
say that, since the legislature decreed it, it is therefore decided.  The 
procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment impose 
constraints on the government when potentially depriving individuals of 
liberty.
182
  A major liberty interest is implicated when an offender could 
serve more time in confinement than the punishment presumes.  Though 
the legislature has provided sentencing guidelines for criminal acts
183
—
even harsh mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain egregious 
                                                          
 178.  SB 123 EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 150. 
 179.  A felony possession conviction is a level 5 felony drug offense. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
5706(c)(1)–(2) (West 2013).  The underlying prison sentence for a felony possession offender with 
no prior felonies ranges from ten to fourteen months.  Id. § 21-6805(a).  For those felony possession 
offenders with one or more prior non-person felonies, the sentencing range is fourteen to twenty-two 
months.  Id.   
 180.  See State v. DeCourcy, 580 P.2d 86, 88 (Kan. 1978). 
 181.  State v. George, No. 108,374, 2013 WL 1729268, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2013) 
(emphasis added) (citing State v. Gary, 144 P.3d 634 (Kan. 2006)). 
 182.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
 183.  See supra note 168. 
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offenses
184
—it has not long been in the business of completely removing 
a judge’s discretion at sentencing, and in turn the offender’s voice, by 
mandating probationary drug treatment.
185
  Aside from the fact that the 
mandatory imposition of probationary drug treatment is bad public 
policy, in light of the above concerns, it also constitutes a denial of due 
process. 
3. Standard Probationers v. SB 123 Probationers: Questions Involving 
Equal Protection. 
The distinction between standard probationers and SB 123 
probationers inevitably brings up the question of equal protection.  The 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution states: “No 
state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of its laws.”
186
  The guiding principle of equal protection is that similarly 
situated individuals should be treated alike.
187
  Both the United States 
and Kansas Supreme Courts employ one of three tests to determine 
whether a legal classification violates equal protection: strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review.
188
  Which test is used 




Generally, a law is subject to rational basis review unless the 
                                                          
 184.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6626 (West 2013) (sentencing “aggravated habitual sex 
offenders” to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole); id. § 21-6627 (sentencing those 
convicted of certain aggravated sex crimes to life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term of 
twenty-five years); id. § 21-6620(a) (sentencing those convicted of capital murder who do not 
receive death to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole).  
 185.  See State v. Gallegos, 190 P.3d 226, 234 (Kan. 2008) (finding that Kansas courts have 
discretion to impose any sentence within the presumptive sentencing range); State v. Richardson, 
901 P.2d 1, 7 (Kan. 1995) (recognizing that the sentencing guidelines are “designed to regulate 
judicial discretion in sentencing but not eliminate it”); State v. Currie, 308 P.3d 1289, 1293 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2013) (finding that presumptive sentences themselves are “subject to the court’s discretion to 
enter a departure sentence”); see also State v. Freeman, 574 P.2d 950, 958 (1978) (noting that, 
although the judge was not statutorily authorized to grant probation or parole, the statute did not 
“have the effect of taking away all judicial discretion in fixing the sentence to be imposed,” and “[i]t 
cannot be said that the sentencing court had no discretion in imposing [the] sentence”).   
 186.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 28 (Kan. 2005) (citing Farley 
v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058 (Kan. 1987)) (“Sections 1 and 2 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of 
Rights ‘are given much the same effect as the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to . . . 
equal protection of the law.’”). 
 187.  Limon, 122 P.3d at 27 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 
(1985)). 
 188.  Id. at 28. 
 189.  Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)). 
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legislative classification targets a suspect class or burdens a fundamental 
right.
190
  Mental illness or mental disability are not considered a suspect 
class, and will only be subject to rational basis review.
191
  Moreover, the 
rational basis test is two-fold: (1) the classification within the law must 
implicate a legitimate goal, and (2) the means chosen by the legislature 
to effectuate that goal must be rationally related.
192
  Rational basis review 
is a deferential standard, and courts will rarely strike down a 
classification under this test.
193
  So deferential is rational basis review 
that courts will uphold a law, even in the absence of legislative 




With this understanding of the basic tenets of equal protection, SB 
123’s denial of jail-time credit becomes immediately concerning.  After 
all, is it not the case that offenders placed into SB 123 probation are 
being denied a right that is statutorily granted to all probationers?  Does 
SB 123’s denial of a statutorily granted jail-time credit not, therefore, 
constitute a violation of equal protection?  The answer is “no.”  To start, 
drug addiction, as a recognized mental disorder by the American 
Psychiatric Association,
195
 is not a suspect classification—any 




Further, a court could conjure rational reasons for why the Kansas 
Legislature decided to treat offenders forced into SB 123 drug treatment 
differently by denying them a jail-time credit.  For example, the 
                                                          
 190.  Id. (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 631). 
 191.  Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432. 
 192.  State v. Preston, 195 P.3d 240, 245 (Kan. 2008) (citing Mudd v. Neosho Mem. Reg. Med. 
Ctr., 62 P.3d 236 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003)). 
 193.  See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331–32 (1981) (recognizing that when classification is 
not suspect and does not “impinge on a fundamental right” it “carries with it a presumption of 
rationality that can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality”). 
 194.  See Ry. Exp. Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111–17 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
See also Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993) (providing a detailed examination of 
judicial deference regarding rational basis classifications and noting that every conceivable 
justification must be negated for an attack to prevail under this standard).  “A State . . . has no 
obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.  ‘A legislative 
choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported 
by evidence or empirical data.’”  Id. at 320 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 
315 (1993)).  
 195.  See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 70, at 189, 175–272 (providing 
descriptions and diagnostic criteria for various substance-related disorders). 
 196.  Heller, 509 U.S. at 321 (citing Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432; Schweiker v. Wilson, 
450 U.S. 221 (1981)) (recognizing that the Court has applied rational basis review to classifications 
involving the mentally disabled and mentally ill). 
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legislature may have viewed such coercive treatment as a way to 
forcefully counter addiction.  They may have considered the denial of 
jail-time credit as a means to coerce offender compliance with 
probationary drug treatment.  Thus, the legislature could have had a 
rational basis for treating SB 123 probationers differently from ordinary 
probationers.  When subject to such light scrutiny, there is no equal 
protection violation. 
There is a more basic reason, though, for why an equal protection 
argument against SB 123 is bound to fail on legal grounds.  In response 
to an SB 123 probationer’s attack against on the law’s denial of a jail-
time credit, the Kansas Supreme Court noted in Preston that: 
While a persuasive argument may be made for the legitimate goals 
supporting the unequal treatment of probationers ordered to inpatient 
treatment, we perceive a more basic impediment to [the SB 123 
probationer’s] equal protection claim.  [Her] arguments rely on her 
classification of persons who are similarly situated as being all 
probationers.  ‘It is well settled that when circumstances differ, drawing 
distinctions . . . does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.’  
Accordingly, [the SB 123 probationer here] is similarly situated with all 
other S.B. 123 probationers; members of that class are not treated 
unequally . . . .
197
 
SB 123 probationers, according to the court, thus comprise a separate 
class of probationers.  Since they comprise a separate class, there is no 
need to analyze whether the denial of a jail-time credit is in violation of 
equal protection, so long as all SB 123 probationers are denied such a 
credit. 
Preston’s holding, though resting on a relatively solid legal 
foundation, is nonetheless artificial when you consider that SB 123 
probationers and standard probationers are not significantly different.  By 
limiting admission to only those convicted of possession, SB 123 carries 
the incorrect assumption that these are the only offenders with drug 
problems.  If this assumption were true, then there would indeed be a 
significant difference in circumstances between the two types of 
probationers.  This assumption, however, is not true.
198
  As described 
                                                          
 197.  Preston, 195 P.3d at 245 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Gaudina, 160 P.3d 854, (Kan. 
2007)). 
 198.  Illustrating the fact that SB 123 probationers do not characteristically differ from other 
offenders, many criminal justice professionals in Kansas have complained that many SB 123 
probationers do not need treatment, while many other offenders do.  SB 123 EVALUATION, supra 
note 106, at 158–65. 
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above, drug addiction leads to all types of crimes.
199
  Offenders of all 
types suffer from addiction, and are likewise in need of serious substance 
abuse treatment.
200
  To say that possession offenders placed in SB 123 
probation are categorically different from other probationers is therefore 
inaccurate. 
Further, assuming that both sets of probationers comprise a single 
class, it is important to consider the rationality of mandating SB 123 
probation and denying a jail-time credit to those who fail the program.  
Just because the legislature’s classifications pass constitutional muster 
does not mean that they achieve the legislature’s goals.  First, if the goal 
of SB 123 is to “provide community punishment and the opportunity for 
treatment to nonviolent offenders with drug abuse problems in order to 
more effectively address the revolving door of drug addicts through the 
state prison,”
201
 then, aside from limiting admission to only possession 
offenders, mandating drug treatment undercuts the goal of SB 123.  
Mandatory admission may actually serve as a hindrance by increasing 
rates of recidivism and subsequent revocation.
202
  Mandatory admission 
requirements “dismiss[] the significance of the individual’s readiness [to] 
engage[] with treatment.”
203
  Moreover, “[a]s criminal justice 
stakeholders noted and offenders confirmed, the ultimate success of 
treatment depends on the individual . . . SB 123 does not provide a clear 
mechanism for translating compulsory compliance with treatment 
through supervision and sanctions into internalized motivation.”
204
  The 
denial of a jail-time credit—assuming this provision was intended to act 
as the “stick” to ensure offender compliance—presupposes a rational 
mind that will appropriately weigh the pros and cons of continued drug 
use in light of criminal punishment.  The problem when dealing with 
                                                          
 199.  See supra notes 101–2. 
 200.  See SB 123 EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 160–62 (explaining that prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and judges have all voiced frustration with SB 123’s narrow eligibility requirements and 
the fact that such narrowness eliminates a great number of other offenders who need treatment).  
“[P]rosecutors [interviewed have] commented that ‘[SB 123] excludes people who need substance 
abuse treatment . . . [and] the program lacks the subjective analysis of who will benefit from 
treatment. . . .’  One judge stated that ‘there are many cases where [addicted] individuals commit 
more serious crimes . . . [but] are not eligible for SB 123 treatment because of the seriousness of the 
current charge, but those people are the ones who probably need the most help because they are 
committing serious crimes to feed their addiction [sic].’”  Id.   
 201.  Preston, 195 P.3d at 244 (quoting Feb. 12, 2003 memorandum from Kansas Sentencing 
Commission to the Senate Judiciary Committee). 
 202.  SB 123 EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 128–30. 
 203.  Id. at 206. 
 204.  Id. 
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those addicted to drugs, however, is that rational thought is severely 
compromised.
205
  To assume that drug-addicted offenders placed into SB 
123 probation will refrain from drugs because they will not receive jail-
time credit after revocation ignores the power of addiction.  It cannot be 
said that mandatory admission and the denial of a jail-time credit furthers 
the underlying goals and objectives of SB 123. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Drug-addicted offenders pose a unique challenge to the criminal 
justice system—a challenge that requires an approach that is both bold 
and smart.  Traditional sanctions are incapable of surmounting the 
problem of illicit drug abuse and addiction.  In recent years, courts across 
the country have developed innovative and educated methods to better 
deal with this intractable problem.  Through these efforts, drug courts 
have emerged as a proven way to check drug use and permanently 
remove drug-addicted individuals from the “revolving door” of criminal 
justice appearances. 
Though SB 123 is a good-intentioned law that takes steps in the right 
direction, it has major deficiencies that severely undermine its goals and 
objectives.  Apart from the law’s serious constitutional concerns, it is 
simply bad public policy.  SB 123 lacks the key ingredients responsible 
for drug court success—primarily, continuous judicial supervision.  SB 
123 is inflexibly limited to only a narrow class of drug offenders, which 
incorrectly assumes that only those caught in possession of drugs are in 
need of treatment.  More importantly, SB 123 has stringent admission 
and termination requirements that ignore the nature of drug addiction—
exacerbating the very problem the program seeks to address.  It is a 
waste of money and much needed resources to continue to sink money 
into such a program.  Rather than continue with a half-hearted program, 
SB 123 should be replaced through the institutionalization of drug courts 
in Kansas.  Having already proven their effectiveness, drug courts 
provide a better way. 
 
                                                          
 205.  See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
